Most "AI policies" are a page of aspirations no one can enforce: "use AI responsibly," "protect confidential data." An acceptable-use policy that actually governs behavior names which tools are approved for which data, what is prohibited, how violations are detected, and who owns exceptions — clauses a security team can enforce and an auditor can test.
Tier: Advanced · Workflow area: AI governance, risk & compliance
This playbook authors that policy for your organization, aligned to ISO 42001 controls and aware of India's DPDP obligations, so the document is both a governance artifact and an operational control. It is the policy that makes every other control in this track — approved endpoints, data minimization, red-team gates — actually mandatory rather than optional.
Classify data before you write a single clause. The policy hinges on data tiers — public, internal, confidential, regulated/personal. Every rule downstream references these tiers.
Map approved tools to data tiers. State explicitly which endpoints are allowed for which data. This is the enforceable core.
Data tier Approved AI tools Prohibited
Public Any approved assistant —
Internal Enterprise/approved endpoints only Public free tiers
Confidential Enterprise endpoint with no-training Any consumer tool
Regulated / personal Local model or on-prem only; redact first Any external endpoint
Write prohibitions as testable clauses. "Do not paste customer PII into consumer AI tools" is enforceable; "protect data" is not. Each prohibition should be something you can detect a violation of.
3.2 Personal data as defined under the DPDP Act 2023 must not be submitted to any
AI endpoint that is not on the approved-for-regulated-data list. Redaction or a
local model is required before processing such data.
Define detection and consequences. State how violations are surfaced (DLP on egress, endpoint allowlisting, audit logs) and the consequence path. A rule with no detection is a suggestion.
Build an exception process. Real work needs exceptions; an AUP without a governed exception path gets ignored wholesale. Define who approves, for how long, with what compensating control.
Align to ISO 42001 and DPDP, and assign an owner. Reference the 42001 policy control (pb-48) and DPDP purpose-limitation, security-safeguard, and consent obligations (pb-52). Name the accountable owner and a review cadence.
An AUP clause is only worth writing if a violation of it can be detected — pair every prohibition with a detection mechanism, or it is advice, not policy.
A policy is enforceable when each clause is testable and each rule has a detection path. Walk the clauses and, for each, ask "how would we catch a violation, and what happens then?" — a clause with no answer is aspirational and should be rewritten concretely or cut. Run the scenario test: take three realistic situations (an engineer pasting a client log into a consumer tool, an analyst processing personal data, a team wanting an unapproved tool) and confirm the policy gives a clear, unambiguous ruling and a defined path for each. Ambiguity that forces a judgment call is where policies fail in practice. Finally, confirm the DPDP-sensitive clauses actually reflect the Act's obligations (purpose limitation, security safeguards, consent) rather than generic privacy language, and that a named owner has approved the document.
When authoring an AUP for a client, write it around their data classification, their approved-tool inventory, and their regulatory posture — a generic template imposed on a client is unenforceable and unowned. Keep the drafting inside their governance environment, encode their per-client and per-data-tier constraints (especially the services-company reality that some client data may never leave an on-prem or approved endpoint), and hand the policy to their designated owner with a review cadence. For Indian clients, ensure the personal-data clauses track DPDP obligations and the CERT-In/DPB breach-reporting interplay (pb-52). Deliver an enforceable document their security team can operate; do not reuse one client's tool allowlist or classifications for another.